

PROTENTATIVE CLASSIFICATION
The classification of this document is based on the information available to the classification authority. You will be notified if the classification differs from the tentative classification.

Approved For Release 2009/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140015-4

Classification Canceled

or changed to

UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY

ISM app II

THE RAND CORPORATION
1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA • 90406

MEMORANDUM

NRO Review Completed.

Date

K-117

MAR 24 1972

MEMO NO.: M-4652

TO: F. R. Collbohm

FROM: A. H. Katz and M. E. Davies

DATE: 9-6-57

SUBJECT: SPECIAL CLEARANCE AND RECCE-INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS

CC: E. J. Barlow, W. B. Graham, R. H. Frick, S. M. Greenfield

(referenced memos not included)

For some time now, we have been attempting to crank up an oft-postponed pre-hostilities recce-intelligence study. The pieces are--for the moment--adequately described in the attached memos. We now realize that this study will likely crash on takeoff unless at least two or three of us get fairly complete access to the collection and analysis activities now in progress in the recce-intelligence field.

We see the problem area which we propose to study in two main parts:

- a) A (wide spectrum) analysis of U.S. needs for Pre-Hostilities Intelligence.
- b) A (narrow spectrum) analysis of USAF methods for satisfying some of the needs of a).

We have good reason to believe that General Putt, Generals Breitweiser and Watson, and the Special Studies Group in Intelligence, are interested in this and would contribute whatever official sponsorship is needed.

What we want to do is adequately described in M-4919 (10-12-56) and M-3203 (6-20-57), attached. If we were to rewrite them today, they would be slightly different--but the tone and center of gravity of the effort required would remain essentially the same.

We are now very sure that the re-evaluation and detailed study of the recoverable satellite is a profitable and potentially feasible notion, especially in light of some recent and novel ideas by Davies on camera systems. This phase of our study could and would well utilize a portion of the effort of Buchheim's good space team.

We can examine three kinds of questions which can be raised before working on any problem:

- a) Is a solution important and needed?
- b) Is a solution possible? Is the problem tractable within finite time and resource constraints?

GROUP-4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

SECRET

NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18 U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Approved For Release 2009/10/22 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500140015-4

~~SECRET~~

- c) Is anyone else working on it? Is the contemplated work duplication of other work?

On all three of these, we score high. We state, without argument, that the solution of the intelligence problem is of extreme importance to our security. Progress in weapons systems has not been matched, for whatever reason, by similar progress in recce-intelligence systems.

We state further, that we can contribute heavily to solution of the problem, which, though difficult, is not impossible.

We feel, based on what we know, that this problem is not now being worked on in the sense in which we want to. The events of the recent Air Council meeting bear out this statement.

Sensible and valuable contributions can be made to this study without assembling a mighty army of analysts. Two men full-time is minimal. Additional help would be needed when the broad brush is supplemented by fine structure work--as in the recoverable satellite project noted above, and as in our two-part look at 461L (context and details).

The Air Council meeting on August 22 was concerned with reconnaissance. RAND's recent work in this area could have played an important role. It likely didn't. We understand that decisions on rates of expenditure for the period through FY61 were made.

We got a few words into this group--we think. What we know for sure is that we missed the boat, lost a good opportunity, and a chance to really influence USAF. Further details are available locally from Katz.

Let us say a few simple things to begin with on the special clearance problem:

- 1) By virtue of our contacts, friends, and inevitable osmotic effects, we already are 'in' some special areas.
- 2) Many of the propositions which we have previously discussed, considered, and worked on have retreated behind the curtain, where we can no longer follow them, work on them, or contribute effectively.
- 3) In order to work meaningfully and with correct perspective in non-special areas, access to the special areas is vital, so that effort in non-special problem areas may be steered intelligently.
- 4) Some of the things we are now working on--461L and 117L--will likely become 'special' as they move closer to operations.
- 5) It will become increasingly difficult to talk authoritatively and meaningfully (let alone make sensible recommendations)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

about requirements, developments, priorities, and procedures for the 1965 era, unless we get and use a more accurate insight into what is going on now.

- 6) Further, on many occasions we are embarrassed when suggesting something which either turns out to have been tried, or is being worked out, and on which the discussion has to trail off inconclusively.

In short, we are in an untenable position. To rephrase an old and eloquent expression, we've got to get cleared or get off this activity.



A. H. Katz



M. E. Davies

AHK:crj

~~SECRET~~